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I.

I NTRODUCTION
In the television show The West Wing, Sam Seaborn, an
idealistic aide to the President, explained his position on public
education as such:
Education is the silver bullet. Education is everything.
We don’t need little changes, we need gigantic,
monumental changes. Schools should be palaces. The
competition for the best teachers should be fierce; they
should be making six-figure salaries. Schools should be
incredibly expensive for government and absolutely free
of charge to its citizens, just like national defense. That’s
my position. I just haven’t figured out how to do it yet. 1
The simile is correct. Yet, we have not figured out how to
finance our elementary and high schools to give each child a
chance to be the best he or she can be. Standing in the way of

1. West Wing: Six Meetings Before Lunch (NBC television broadcast Apr. 5,
2000).
141
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public education-finance reform at the national level is that,
unlike national defense, the job of financing public education is left
to the individual states, not the federal government. There is no
explicit or implicit grant of the right to an education in the Federal
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to intervene and federalize the issue in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 2 In that case, parents of
public school students challenged Texas’ school financing system
based on property taxes because of the huge disparities that
resulted between high-wealth and low-wealth districts. 3 A
sympathetic Court described the Texas system as “chaotic and
unjust” and emphasized the need for reform in a tax system that
“relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax.” 4 In the
end, however, the Court concluded that this was an issue beyond
the scope of the Federal Constitution, and effectively ended any
possibility of a national solution to the problem of public education
finance reform. 5
Contrary to the Federal Constitution, almost every state
constitution, including Illinois’s, specifically guarantees its
citizens’ the right to a free and efficient education provided by the
state. The Illinois Constitution provides: “The State shall provide
for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services . . . . The State has the primary
responsibility for financing the system of public education.” 6
However, despite state constitutional mandates, nearly all fifty
states are struggling with how to finance public education. Fortyfive of the fifty states have experienced litigation on school
financing. 7 New Hampshire was one of the first states to see its
school funding system struck down by the courts in 1993. 8 Illinois
has not been immune from the challenges surrounding school
funding. In fact, Illinois is currently ranked 50th in terms of state
contribution to public education according to data provided by the
U.S. Department of Education. 9 This article will advocate for a
number of reforms, which will minimize spending disparities

2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. Id. at 4–6.
4. Id. at 58.
5. Id. at 59.
6. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
7. Daniel Thatcher, State Role in Education Finance, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education
/state-role-in-education-finance.aspx (last visited September 24, 2014).
8. Molly Hunter, New Hampshire Court Declares Funding System
Unconstitutional, ACCESS Q UALITY EDUCATION (Mar. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/3-13-06nhsummjdgmt.php3.
9. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., FACT SHEET: ILLINOIS RANKS LAST IN STATE
CONTRIBUTION TO P–12 FUNDING; EFAB “FOUNDATION LEVEL” NOT APPROVED
SINCE FY02 (2013), available at http://www.isbe.state.il.us/budget/FY14/factsheet4-efab.pdf [hereinafter, ISBE FACT SHEET].
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across the state, enhance equality in per-pupil funding, and lower
overall operating cost. The article will begin with a comprehensive
overview of the current public school funding scheme and the
problems that result from it. In addition, the article will examine
the recent history of litigation aimed at reforming the system.
Next,
this
article will
examine the proposed reform
recommendations made by the Illinois Senate Education Funding
Advisory Committee and the Illinois Speaker of the House. The
article will also address arguments against reform and in favor of
keeping the emphasis on local financing. Finally, the article shall
make the case for dismantling the current funding system in favor
of one that places more responsibility on the state, rather than
local districts.

I. ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
States utilize a number of different state education financing
plans, although the majority still delegate a large portion of the
financing responsibility to local school districts. In turn, the local
school districts rely heavily on local property tax revenue for
funding. 10 Two common approaches favored by states that rely
primarily on location taxation are the District Power Equalization
(DPE) method and the Foundation Support method. The DPE
method is designed to guarantee that all local school districts will
receive the same property tax yield for the same tax rate. 11 The
Foundation Support method measures local tax contributions
against predetermined per-pupil expenditure levels, and then
requires the state to cover the balance. 12

A. Education Funding Advisory Board
Illinois currently operates a multi-layered system for public
education financing known as a modified Foundation Level
approach. 13 The Illinois General Assembly sets the Foundation
Level, which is the minimum amount that all school districts are
supposed to have the ability to expend per pupil. The funding
comes from a combination of state aid and local property tax
revenue. One of the traditional problems with the Foundation
Level is that it was historically tied to available General Revenue
10. CENTER FOR TAX AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, ISSUE BRIEF:
ILLINOIS’ SCHOOL FUNDING FORMULA AND G ENERAL STATE AID 3 (2006),
available at http://www.ctbaonline.org/sites/default/files/reports/ctba.limered
staging.com/node/add/repositoryreport/1386537570/IB_2006.08.01_Issue%20
Brief-Illinois%27%20School%20Funding%20Formula.pdf
[hereinafter
GSA
BRIEF].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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funds, and not to any objective measure of the cost of an adequate
education. 14 In order to address this problem, Gov. Edgar signed
Public Act 90-548 in 1997, which created the Illinois Education
Funding Advisory Board (EFAB). 15 The EFAB is a nonpartisan
board made up of representatives from education, business and
the public. 16 The statutory mandate for the board states that in
consultation with the State Board of Education (ISBE), the board
shall “make recommendations . . . to the General Assembly for the
foundation level.” 17 In other words, the advisory board’s mission
each year is to identify a minimum per-pupil funding level, based,
not on available state General Revenues, but on the actual cost of
providing an adequate education. The metric used to define an
adequate education is an education that is sufficient in quality so
that at least 67% of Illinois’s non-at-risk children will pass state
mandated standardized tests. 18 At-risk children who come from
concentrated poverty, broken homes or have special needs are far
more expensive to educate and therefore the state provides
additional funding for them. As such, they are excluded from this
particular metric. 19
The EFAB uses a methodology for computing the cost per
child of meeting this “adequate education” standard and makes
that amount its recommended Foundation Level. 20 The
methodology looks at per-child spending in school districts that
were already meeting the standard of having two-thirds (67%) of
their non-at-risk children passing the required standardized tests.
However, in order to not inflate the Foundation Level, the EFAB
based its recommendation on “the basic education expenditures of
low-spending schools exhibiting a high academic performance.” 21
That is to say, the EFAB isolated the spending of so-called
“efficient” school districts where both at least two-thirds of the
non-at-risk children passed standardized tests, and spending per
child was at or below what local economic cost factors indicated
they should spend to achieve those results. These “efficient”
spending school districts were identified using quantitative
analysis provided by the nationally recognized educationconsulting firm Augenblick & Myers. In order to be considered
“efficient”, the district had to satisfy a number of criteria, “such as:
(1) level of success in meeting state standards; (2) socio-economic

14. Id. at 5.
15. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05 (1998).
16. EDUCATION FUNDING ADVISORY BD., ILLINOIS EDUCATION FUNDING
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2013), available at http://www.isbe.net/EFAB/pdf/finalreport-01-13.pdf [hereinafter EFAB REPORT].
17. Id.
18. GSA BRIEF, supra note 10, at 5.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
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characteristics such as district wealth or proportion of pupils from
low-income families; and (3) efficiency in terms of spending.” 22
This approach excluded high spending school districts in affluent
communities, particularly those found along the North Shore.
Although the EFAB was created for the purposes of
developing a Foundation Level that was based on the actual cost of
efficiently educating students and not simply available funds, the
Illinois General Assembly has only adopted the recommended
Foundation Level once since the board’s first recommendation in
January 2001 for FY02. 23 As of January 2013, Illinois would need
an additional $4.7 billion in GSA funding to meet the current
EFAB recommended Foundation Level. 24

B. General State Aid Formulas
The second element to the public school financing scheme in
Illinois is the General State Aid formula (GSA). The purpose of the
GSA is to determine how much State money will be sent to the
individual school districts to help them meet the Foundation Level
set by the General Assembly for a given fiscal year. 25 There are
three variations of the GSA formula used to make that
determination. Not every district has the ability to pay for its own
educational expenses. For example, districts such as East St. Louis
School District 18, Cicero School District 99 and Joliet School
District 86 are unable to raise enough property tax revenue to
meet the statutory Foundation Level. 26 The goal of the GSA,
through formula grants, is to ensure that districts like these have
enough funding to meet the per-pupil Foundation Level. The
Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) determines which of the
three formula variations to use for each district based on that
district’s available local property tax revenue.
The first formula variation is the “Foundation Level”
Formula. To qualify as a Foundation Level district, a local school
district must have available local property tax resources that will
only cover 93% or less of the Foundation Level amount set by the
General Assembly. 27 The formula calculates local resources by
looking at the assessed value of the local property multiplied by
2.3% for elementary districts (elementary and middle schools),
1.05% for high school districts, and 3.0% for unit districts (districts

22. Id.
23. ISBE FACT SHEET, supra note 7.
24. EFAB REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
25. GSA BRIEF, supra at 10.
26. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., G ENERAL STATE AID, FY2013 GSA
CALCULATION VARIABLES (2013), available at http://www.isbe.net/funding/
html/gsa.htm.
27. ISBE FACT SHEET, supra note 3.
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which include K–12). 28 Added to this number is any revenue
generated from the Corporate Personal Property Replacement Tax
(CPPR). 29 Finally, the figure is divided by the school district’s
average daily attendance figure. In FY2013, District 189 (East St.
Louis) was an example of a foundation district. The District was
only able to raise $891 per-pupil from local property tax revenue.
Therefore, the State provided funding for the $5,228 per-pupil
funding needed to meet the required level. 30 There are 620
foundation districts, which account for about 71% of Illinois public
school students. 31
If a district can cover between 93% and 175% of the
foundation level from its own local property tax revenue, that
school district will have its GSA calculated by using the
Alternative Formula. 32 The Alternative Formula is based on the
General Assembly’s Foundation Level, multiplied by the ADA, and
then multiplied again by the available local resources. 33 It
provides 5% to 7% of the Foundation Level amount, while the rest
of the funding comes from local property taxes. The Alternative
Formula covers about 15% of all schools in Illinois. 34
The last formula variation is the Flat Grant. Flat Grant
districts have available local property tax revenue that is 175% or
greater than the Foundation Level. These districts have, at a
minimum, the capacity to spend around $5,000 per student, which
his almost three times the current Foundation Level. 35 Although
Flat Grant districts are capable of spending above the foundation
level, they still receive some extra funding from the State. 36 The
Flat Grant formula multiplies the district’s ADA by $218 (Flat
Grant = (ADA X $218)) in order to determine how much GSA
funding to which the district is entitled. 37 New Trier High School
District 203, which serves a number of affluent communities just
north of Chicago, along the North Shore, is an example of a flat
grant district. 38 It raises about $14,716 in local property taxes per
28. GSA BRIEF, supra note 10, at 7.
29. Id.
30. Ted Dabrowski, et al., Understanding Illinois' Broken Education
Funding System, ILLINOIS POLICY INSTITUTE 8 (2013), available at
http://www.illinoispolicy.org/wp-content/files_mf/1380814767Ed_finance_1.pdf
[hereinafter Dabrowski].
31. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., Data Analysis and Accountability, available
at http://www.isbe.net/research/FallEnrollmentCounts.
32. EFAB REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
33. GSA BRIEF, supra note 8, at 7.
34. Id.
35. CENTER FOR TAX AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, MONEY MATTERS:
HOW THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEM CREATES SIGNIFICANT
EDUCATION INEQUITIES THAT IMPACT MOST STUDENTS IN THE STATE 11 (2009)
[hereinafter, MONEY].
36. Id. at 6.
37. GSA BRIEF, supra note 8, at 7.
38. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., supra note 26.
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pupil. 39 Statewide, there are only 72 Flat Grant school districts,
making up 6% of Illinois public school students. 40 Statewide, Flat
Grant districts are clustered north of interstate 80, with only three
school districts “downstate” or south of I-80 (2 districts in Peoria
and 1 district in Logan). 41
In addition to the GSA formula grants, the state recognizes
that districts with high concentrations of poverty face additional
challenges in educating their students. Therefore, the state
provides supplemental funding for at-risk or low-income students
in the form of Supplemental General Aid, commonly referred to as
the “Poverty Grant.” 42 The state does not allocate funds simply
based on the actual number of students that fail, but rather uses
family income to predict how many are likely to fail. The rationale
behind this is that the state does not want to create a monetary
incentive for school districts to fail kids, and studies have shown
that family income is associated with student performance. 43 The
formula allocates funds at a greater amount per-pupil as the
percentage of low-income students increases. To illustrate, a
district with a low percentage (0%–15%) of low-income pupils
would receive about $355 per-pupil in supplemental funding. 44 On
the other hand, a district with a very high percentage of lowincome students would receive about $3,000 per-pupil. 45

C. Subsidies
In addition to the already complicated school-funding
formulas described above, there are subsidies that affect the
funding system. These subsidies present unique challenges that
most other state school financing system do not face. In order to
limit the property tax increases that accompanied rising home
values in the 1980s, legislators in Springfield passed the Property
Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL). 46 The law gives all
Illinois counties the ability to hold referendums to determine
whether to cap countywide property tax growth. PTELL limits a
local government’s increase in yearly tax revenues to 5% or the
rate of inflation, whichever is lower. 47 In order to levy taxes
39. Id.
40. Dabrowski, supra note 29, at 8.
41. MONEY, supra note 30, at 13.
42. See EFAB REPORT, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing the Poverty Grant
as a funding stream for at-risk students).
43. GSA BRIEF, supra note 10, at 7–8.
44. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., FACT SHEET: G ENERAL STATE AID (2014),
available at http://www.isbe.net/budget/FY14/fy14-bu dget.pdf.
45. Id.
46. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/18 (2014).
47. ILL. DEPT. OF REVENUE , PROPERTY TAX LIMITATION EXTENSION LAW:
TECHNICAL MANUAL 7 (2013), available at http://www.revenue.state.il.us
/publications/LocalGovernment/PTAX 1080.pdf.
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greater than the capped amount, local referendums must take
place. Today, nearly 40 percent of Illinois counties, including Cook
County, are under tax caps. 48 While the PTELL legislation was
enacted to help property owners deal with rising property tax bills,
it has had an adverse affect on the local school districts within
those counties because it limits their access to property tax
revenues. 49
In order to address the problem this created for school
districts in PTELL counties, the state created the PTELL
Adjustment. The PTELL Adjustment allows districts operating
under property tax caps to essentially underreport the true
amount of their property values using a complex series of formulas
and calculations intended to reflect the impact of the property tax
caps. 50 As a result, counties that have enacted property tax caps
tend to receive more funding from the GSA, because the formula
focuses on a school district’s ability to meet the Foundation Level
via local property tax revenue. 51
The best example of how PTELL Adjustments work is the
largest school district in Illinois, Chicago School District 299
(which includes all of Chicago Public Schools). District 299 has
more than $88 billion worth of property within its borders. 52
However, because of Cook County’s property tax cap, the funding
formula assumes Chicago has only $54 billion worth of property. 53
A 2011 study conducted by the EFAB found that the Cook County
PTELL accounted for a loss of $443.5 million for Chicago School
District 299. 54 In the last thirteen years, the amount of GSA funds
to PTELL districts has grown substantially, from $46 million in
FY2000 to $502 million in FY2013—an increase of 519 percent. 55
Another unique challenge facing the school financing system
is the affect of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts. There is
heated debate on whether TIF districts have an overall positive or
negative impact on local school districts, particularly in Chicago. 56
TIFs are tools used by cities and towns to help spur economic
48. ILL. DEPT. OF REVENUE , HISTORY OF PTELL (2012), available at
http://tax.illinois.gov/LocalGovernment/PropertyTax/PTELLcounties.pdf.
49. Dabrowski, supra note 29, at 13–15.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id.
54. AUGENBLICK, PALAICH & ASSOCS., O VERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF
THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM (2013) [hereinafter AUGENBLICK].
55. AUGENBLICK, supra note 54, at 23.
56. See Frank Manzo IV, To Divert or Not To Divert: The Impact of TIF's
on Chicago Public Schools, CHICAGO POLICY REVIEW (2012), available at
http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2012/03/29/to-divert-or-not-to-divert-the-impactof-tifs-on-chicago-public-schools (stating “[i]n the City of Chicago, where the
public school system and other taxing jurisdictions are coping with large
budget deficits, much attention and criticism has been focused on a particular
economic development tool . . .”).

2014]

Illinois Gets an “F” in Public School Financing

149

growth. When a TIF is established, the City creates a baseline
property value: property taxes on this baseline amount will
continue accruing to the city while taxes on increases in property
value above the baseline go to the TIF district to fund economic
development. 57 To better understand how TIFs work, consider the
following illustration from Chicago Magazine:
When the city council creates a TIF district, it freezes the
value of property in that district for up to 24 years. If
your property’s assessable is $100 when the TIF is
created, it will remain at $100 for the following 24
years—at least as far as the schools, parks, county and
other taxing bodies are concerned. 58
There are currently 165 TIF districts in Chicago, and the City
estimates that between 2013–2017, TIF districts will fund $1.5
billion
of
projects throughout Chicago’s neighborhoods. 59
Opponents of TIFs argue that those funds are being diverted away
from Chicago Public Schools (CPS), forcing the state to give more
in GSA. 60 On the other hand, proponents point to the fact that,
overall, TIFs have provided nearly $800 million in CPS capital
improvement projects. 61 In 2011, the University of Illinois Labor
Education Program published a report that addressed the intense
debate on TIFs. The report produced a middle-of-the-road
conclusion that TIF districts do in fact divert some money away
from public schools, but that TIFs also provide at least some
benefit to CPS. 62 The ambiguous conclusion underlines the
complexity caused by using local property tax revenue to fund both
economic development and public education.

57. Id.
58. Whet Moser, How Much Do TIFs Cost the Chicago Public Schools?,
CHICAGO MAGAZINE (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://www.chicagomag.com
/Chicago-Magazine/The-312/April-2012/How-Much-Do-TIFs-Cost-the-ChicagoPublic-Schools.
59. TIF Projection Report, CITYOFCHICAGO.ORG http://www.cityofchicago
.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/tif_projection_reports.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2015).
60. Id. at 17–18.
61. See Frank Manzo IV, To Divert or Not To Divert: The Impact of TIF's
on Chicago Public Schools, CHICAGO POLICY REVIEW (Mar. 2012), available at
http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2012/03/29/to-divert-or-not-to-divert-the-impactof-tifs-on-chicago-public-schools (stating, “However, tax increment financing is
not all bad for Chicago Public Schools. The report shows that TIFs provided
more than $813 million for CPS capital improvement projects.”).
62. Robert Bruno & Alison Dickson Quesada, Tax Increment Financing
and Chicago Public Schools: A New Approach to Comprehending a Complex
Relationship, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN LABOR
EDUCATION PROGRAM 19 (2011).
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II. INADEQUATE FUNDING, I NADEQUATE EDUCATION
Illinois provided $6.7 billion in education funding to schools
during the 2013–2014 fiscal year, with 41% distributed through the
various General State Aid formulas 63 discussed above. The state
provided 26% of the $6.7 billion in funds to at-risk students through
the supplemental Poverty Grant 64. The remaining funds were
distributed through various grants to programs for bilingual
students, special education, transportation, early childhood
education, the Chicago Block Grant, and other small categorical
programs, which are not distributed based on need. For FY13, only
45 percent of state education dollars were equalized based on a
district’s relative wealth. 65 It is clear that the current school funding
system does not meet its purpose of equalizing funding disparities
caused by the great variations in property wealth between Illinois
school districts. To make matters worse, there is not enough general
revenue for the state to close the per-pupil funding gap. 66

A. Growing Disparities
A study commissioned by the General Assembly found that
local revenue was negatively associated with district need and
strongly associated with district wealth. 67 The imputed local tax
rate was 3.27% of property wealth in FY12, which represented a
decline from 3.89% in FY07 and 3.61% in 2002. In other words, the
local tax rate is declining despite a growing reliance on local
revenue to fund public school districts. 68 The downward trend in
local property tax rates hurts property-poor districts far more than
it does property-wealthy ones. Property-wealthy districts are able
to implement lower tax rates while still raising a substantial
amount of revenue. On the other hand, property-poor districts are
unable to meet their district’s financial needs, despite having
higher property tax rates. 69
Due to the disparity in funding, Illinois school districts have
wide variations in the amount of per-pupil spending. The fact that
the variations in spending are related to district wealth—and not
district need—is troubling. One would expect that a district with a
greater amount of students would need spending more. However,
in Illinois, the relationship is between spending and revenue from

63. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., supra note 26.
64. Id.
65. ILLINOIS G ENERAL ASSEMBLY, SENATE EDUCATION FUNDING ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT 4 (2014) [hereinafter, SENATE REPORT].
66. EFAB REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.
67. AUGENBLICK, supra note 54, at 2–3.
68. Id. at 43–44.
69. Id. at 46.
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property wealth, not need. 70 The Chicago Tribune illustrated an
example of the funding disparities in 2011, when it compared the
per-pupil spending of two elementary school districts in the
Chicagoland area. Taft elementary school in Lockport spent $7,023
per student in 2010, while Roundout elementary school, in affluent
Lake Forest, spent $24,244 per student. 71 To say it another way,
elementary school children at Roundout received more than three
times the funding that the children at Taft elementary received. 72
In fact, it is not uncommon in Illinois to see a spending gap
between districts of $15,000 or more. 73 An analysis of district
spending per-pupil shows there is a strong, positive correlation
between local revenue per student and spending per student. 74
The reliance on local revenue, and its strong association with
district wealth, undermines the fiscal equity across districts in
Illinois. Additionally, state aid is insufficient to alleviate the
impact of local revenue on spending.

B. The Consequences
The disparity in school district funding resulting from a heavy
reliance on local property taxes undermines the State’s
fundamental goal of providing quality education to Illinois
students. It can sometimes be difficult to quantify the relationship
between spending and a child’s academic success, because of the
number of variables that go into determining the overall academic
success of a child. However, a comprehensive study by the Illinois
Center for Tax and Budget Accountability (CTBA) offered
substantial evidence that there is a quantifiable correlation
between per-pupil spending and a child’s educational success. 75
The CTBA study tracked academic performance against
instructional expenses. While the data is five years old, it remains
one of the most complete studies on the nexus between academic
performance and spending in Illinois. The analysis focused on
districts with low concentrations of poverty. 76 At spending levels
up to $5,000 in per-pupil in instructional expenses, nearly half the
school districts achieved the expected outcomes or better, and the
other half performed worse than the expected outcomes. When
70. Id. at 34–45.
71. Lisa Black, Spending Gap Between State’s Rich, Poor Schools is Vast,
CHI . TRIB. (Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-1107/news/ct-met-school-funding-gaps-20111107_1_spending-gap-taft-s-districtpoorest-schools.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See AUGENBLICK, supra note 54, at 48–49 (discussing the local revenue
versus per-pupil spending in schools).
75. See MONEY, supra note 30, at 11–12 (using ISAT performance testing
to determine correlation).
76. Id. at 12.
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instructional spending increased, however, so did the student’s
performance. At a spending level of $7,000 per-pupil, nearly all of
the districts performed at or above the predicted levels. 77
Therefore, an increase in per-student spending of approximately
$2,000 had a noticeable impact on student achievement. It should
be noted that on average, Flat Grant districts in Illinois spent
$2,324 a year more per child than did Foundation Level districts. 78
A compelling aspect of the regression analysis is that the
study controls for family environment. 79 That is to say, the
students in the school districts analyzed in the CTBA study live in
little to no poverty. The students have supportive families and
have education reinforced at home. 80 This is significant because
these factors are cited as being especially important for predicting
academic success. 81 The CTBA study shows that in the debate
regarding the impact of additional funding for school districts, a
meaningful improvement in academic performance correlates
directly with an added investment in instruction, even when
equalizing the impact of outside the classroom socio-economic
factors.

C. Disparate Impact

It is important to acknowledge the disparate impact that
reliance on local revenue has on African-American children in
Illinois. Currently 55% of African-American children live in the
state’s 5% of school districts with the highest rates of poverty and
the lowest property tax revenue. 82 Moreover, 93% of AfricanAmerican children live in school districts where the concentrated
poverty rate is at least 30 percent. 83 Over the last 40 years, the
Prairie State has spent, on average, $1,500 less per student on
African-American children than their white peers. 84

III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEWS OF ATTEMPTED REFORMS
The problems facing public education funding in Illinois are
not recent developments. Politicians and ordinary citizens alike
have made a number of attempts at serious reform. Notably, Dawn
Clark Netsch, one of the architects of the 1970 Constitution, made
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ellyn Fortino, Ralph Martire: Illinois School Funding Reform Must
Include Changes to Tax Policy, PROGRESS ILLINOIS (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.progressillinois.com/quick-hits/content/2014/02/11/ralph-martireillinois-school-funding-reform-must-include-changes-tax-.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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education finance reform a centerpiece of her gubernatorial
campaign. 85 Also, the Illinois courts have heard a number of
challenges from local citizens arguing the need for a reformed
system.

A. Reform Through the Courts
The current Illinois Constitution was ratified on December
15, 1970 and went into effect on July 1, 1971. In the last fortythree years, there have been several notable challenges to the
state’s school financing system based on Article X, Section 1 of the
State Constitution. 86
Only two years after its ratification in 1970, a challenge
regarding the word “efficient”, which is used in the second
sentence of Section 1, was brought. 87 The word was carried over
from the previous 1870 Constitution. Previous challenges under
the old Constitution had left the definition of “efficient” to the
legislature and the school districts, a view continued by the court
with the 1970 Constitution. 88
In 1995, a group of Chicago Public School parents brought an
equal protection claim against the school board and the State. The
parents argued that as a result of low performing schools in
Chicago, their children were being denied equal protection and
that, as parents, they were denied the right to guide the education
of their children. 89 The plaintiffs asked the Court to order the
creation of a voucher system from the funds intended for the low
performing schools. 90 The parents intended to use the vouchers to
send their kids to private schools. Like the United States Supreme
Court in Rodriguez, the Illinois Court was sympathetic, but it
found that being in a state of poverty did not create a suspect
class. 91 The Court also stated that the “right to a high quality
education” is not a fundamental right. 92
Four years later, students from public schools in East St.
Louis, one of the State’s poorest cities, brought a unique challenge
stemming from the physically unsafe schools in the district. The
students argued that the mandatory school attendance law
deprived them of their “liberty.” Therefore, it was the State’s duty
85. Rick Pearson, GOP Kills Edgar’s School Tax Plan, CHI . TRIB. (Mar. 28,
1996), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-03-28/news/960403
0073_1_jim-edgar-rank-and-file-legislators-tax-increase.
86. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (stating that “[t]he State shall provide for an
efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services . . .”).
87. Id.
88. Allen v. Maurer, 286 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1972).
89. Jenkins v. Leininger, 659 N.E.2d 1366, 1372–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1995).
90. Id. at 1376.
91. Id. at 1374.
92. Id. at 1373.
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to provide them with a safe school environment. 93 The Illinois
State Supreme Court held that their claim was insufficient to give
rise to a due process claim under the Federal Constitution, and
that under the “lockstep” doctrine, it was also insufficient under
the Illinois Constitution. 94 The “lockstep doctrine” holds that a
state constitutional provision should be interpreted identically
with its counterpart under the Federal Constitution. 95
There has been significant litigation regarding the fifth
sentence of Section 1, as well. The controversy revolves around
whether it is a judicially enforceable mandate, or simply a
hortatory statement of a goal. 96 In 1973, just three years after
ratification, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a lawsuit
compelling the State to cover at least 50% of the cost of publicsubsidized university education could go forward and was not a
political question. 97 However, the Illinois Supreme Court also said
that the debate records from the constitutional convention showed
that the delegates intended the sentence to be a mere statement of
a goal, and thus found in favor of the State. 98 In the State’s favor
was the testimony of the principle sponsor of the fifth sentence,
who saw it as a non-binding substitute for a defeated proposal. 99
The seminal case is Committee For Education Rights v.
Edgar, a 1996 case in which the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
dismissal of all counts brought in the complaint. Two of the counts
were based on the equal protection clause of the Illinois State
Constitution, Article 1, Section 2. The plaintiffs alleged that the
statutory school financing system violated the equal protection
clause. 100 The Court, however, said that it would decide Illinois
equal protection claims “in lockstep with” the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution. Citing the landmark U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriquez, the Illinois Supreme Court
determined that there is no fundamental right to an education
under the Illinois Constitution. 101 The Court noted that the
language of Article X, Section 1 of the state Constitution says that

93. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 809 (Ill. 1999).
94. Id. at 819.
95. ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
G UIDE 213 (2010).
96. Id.
97. Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ill. 1973).
98. Id.
99. DAWN CLARK NETSCH, 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 4145 (August 13, 1970) (stating “I concede that
the language I have put down is, in the Convention’s usual fashion, hortatory.
I do not believe that it states a legally enforceable duty on the part of the State
through the General Assembly or otherwise. I do not intend that it states a
legally enforceable duty.”).
100. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996).
101. Id.
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education is “a fundamental goal,” not a “fundamental right.” 102
The Court applied the rational basis test pursuant to Jenkins v.
Leininger, and held that it could not say that the value of equal
financial resources outweighed the value of local control over
schools. 103 The Court said that the current means by which Illinois
achieved that fundamental goal “might be thought unwise,
undesirable, or unenlightened” but it was an issue for the political
process, not the courts. 104 Clearly, the Illinois Supreme Court was
unwilling to enter the thicket of school financing.
In 2012, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed to hear another
case challenging the state’s school financing system. 105 The
plaintiffs, Carr and Newel, challenged the use of local tax
assessments as a key variable in the provisioning of state
education payments to school districts. 106 To avoid direct conflict
with the Court’s ruling in Committee For Education Rights, the
plaintiffs argued that the education finance system violates the
equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution by forcing
property owners in districts with low property values to pay a
higher property tax rate than those in similar districts with higher
property values. 107
In the case, Carr, a homeowner in Homewood Flossmoor
Consolidated High School District 233 in Cook County (a
Foundation Level district), paid annual school property taxes at a
rate of 4.10% in 2006. This generated instructional expenditures of
$7,292 in FY07. 108 In contrast, argued Carr, a similarly situated
property owner in New Trier High School District 203 (a Flat
Grant district also in Cook County), was taxed at a rate of 1.66
percent. 109 That is a rate almost two and half times lower than
Carr’s tax rate. Nonetheless, students at New Trier High School
received $10,641 in per-pupil funding, $3,349 more than students
at Homewood-Flossmoor High School. 110 Additionally, New Trier
students still received $218 per-pupil in GSA Flat Grant Funds. 111
Likewise, Newell, a homeowner in Cairo Unified School
District 1 (a Foundation Level district) paid annual school
property taxes at rate of 6.95% (2006) in order to generate
instructional expenditures of $6,192. 112 In nearby Jo Daviess
County, a similarly situated homeowner in Scales Mound CUSD
211 (a Flat Grant district) was taxed at a rate of 3.33%, or less
102. Id. at 1200.
103. Id. at 1195.
104. Id. at 1204.
105. Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E. 2d 326 (2012).
106. Id.
107. Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 326, 328 (2012).
108. Id. at 328.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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than half that paid by Newell in 2006. 113 However, the students at
Scales Mound received over $2,400 more per-pupil in instructional
expenditures. 114
The plaintiffs further argued that the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act and the Illinois Learning Standards, which impose
penalties on districts that do not meet the standards, have
changed the focus of education. Specifically, the present funding
system is no longer rationally related to the current structure of
public education. 115 Carr and Newell pointed out that Springfield
mandates exams for all students, and have increased their control
over what where once local school district powers and functions. 116
Consequently, their argument was that the financing of schools
could no longer be a predominately local responsibility.
The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately rejected the arguments
made by Carr and Newell, and concurred with the appellate
court’s decision that Carr and Newell did not have standing to sue
the state. 117 The Court reasoned that the education funding
statute is “not a taxing statute,” but rather a funding statute. 118
Further, the Court pointed out that although the statute assumes
a certain local property tax rate in calculating available local
resources, the statute does not require school districts to tax at
those rates as a precondition for receiving the statutorily
determined amount of general state aid. 119 The Court noted that
school districts are not rewarded or penalized for taxing above or
below the statutorily assumed property tax rate. In other words,
school districts receive the statutorily determined general state
aid regardless of the local property tax rate actually imposed. 120 “It
is entirely within the discretion of the school districts to determine
the actual rate of local property taxes.” 121
The Court also rejected the argument that Illinois Learning
Standards have fundamentally altered the nature of education in
the state. 122 The Court noted that the amount of general state aid
a school district receives is not at all tied to performance. 123 The
penalties associated with the Illinois Learning Standards are

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 335.
116. Id. at 329.
117. Id. at 336.
118. Id. at 332. The education funding statute is simply that: a funding
statute; not a taxing statute. Id.
119. Id. (stating that although the education funding statute assumes a
certain local property tax rate in calculating Available Local Resources, the
statute does not require districts to impose that tax rate in order to receive the
statutorily determined amount of general state aid.)
120. Id. at 333.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 334.
123. Id.
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found in an entirely different statute, separate from the school
funding statute. 124 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Carr
reinforced the non-interventionalist philosophy regarding public
education financing previously articulated in the Edgar decision.

B. Reform Through the Political Process
Attempts at reforming the school funding scheme via the
political process have also been unsuccessful. In 1992, Illinois
voters narrowly defeated a proposed constitutional amendment
that would have required Springfield to pick up more than half of
school funding bill statewide. 125 During her 1994 gubernatorial
campaign, Dawn Clark Netsch made public school finance reform
a centerpiece of her campaign. Her platform included a 1.25%
income tax increase in order to reduce local property taxes and
implement a system of statewide financing. 126 Jim Edgar, who
vocally opposed her education plan, defeated Netsch in the 1994
race. Ironically, by 1996, Gov. Edgar had changed his stance, and
proposed a plan for education reform that mirrored many of the
elements offered by Netsch that he had previously opposed. 127
However, only portions of the changes were implemented, and
local financing remained a cornerstone of the scheme. 128
Perhaps the best chance at widespread reform came in 2006,
when Democratic Governor Rod Blagojevich was re-elected and
Democrats captured all of the statewide elected offices. Rather
than adopting a version of earlier plans, Gov. Blagojevich instead
proposed a gross receipts tax to fund public education. 129 The plan
was quite unpopular with the General Assembly and public at
large, and was soon abandoned. 130 The financial crisis that began
124. Id. at 334.
125. Bob Secter, Reliance on Local Money Drives School Funding
Imbalances, CHI . TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://articles.chicagotri
bune.com/2010-03-30/news/ct-met-school-funding-20100330_1_school-fundingreliance-on-local-money-local-control-state.
126. Thomas Hardy, State’s Big Teachers Union Puts Weight Behind
Netsch, CHI . TRIB. (Jul. 3, 1994), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/1994-07-03/news/9407030254_1_jim-edgar-education-reform-illinois-educ
ation-association.
127. Rick Pearson, Edgar Links School-Reform Money with Accountability,
CHI . TRIB. (Apr. 15, 1997), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/199704-15/news/9704150137_1_accountability-jim-edgar-reform.
128. Rick Pearson, GOP Kills Edgar’s School Tax Plan, CHI . TRIB. (Mar.
28, 1996), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-03-28/news/960
4030073_1_jim-edgar-rank-and-file-legislators-tax-increase.
129. Ray Long and Jeffery Mietrodt, House Set for Tax Plan Faceoff,
Blagovevich pitches gross-receipts idea, CHI . TRIB. (May 10, 2007), available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-05-10/news/0705091461_1_house-spea
ker-michael-madigan-gross-receipts-tax-business-tax.
130. The Black Knights of Illinois, CHI . TRIB. (May 18, 2007), available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-05-18/news/0705170840_1_tax-scheme-
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in 2008 put additional strain on state resources, and shifted the
focus from school finance reform towards jobs and the state’s
looming pension crises.

C. Illinois Senate Leads Current Action
On January 31, 2014, the bi-partisan Senate Education
Funding Advisory Committee released a report that provides a
number of recommendations regarding the distribution of funds to
school districts. In July 2013 the Illinois Senate created the
Committee, which comprises State Senators from both sides of the
aisle. The Committee heard testimony from at least eighteen
different public interest groups, including some school districts. In
addition, the Committee engaged Augenblick, Palaich and
Associates, the consulting group that helped develop the current
system, and the Massachusetts Department of Education. 131
The Committee devised a set of recommended reforms for
funding public education in the state. The Committee sought to
ensure that the education-funding scheme recommendations would
meet four essential goals: (1) adequacy; (2) equity; (3) student
success; (4) support for teachers and leaders. 132
The Committee recommended that the state replace the three
formulas that currently make up the GSA with a single foundation
funding formula. The formula would include all current
educational funding programs, except for early childhood grants,
funding for capital projects, and high-cost special education. 133 The
formula change would mean that 96% of state operational dollars
for public education would flow through a single school funding
formula. The formula would be equalized depending on each
district’s relative wealth. 134 In addition, the Committee stated that
the new formula must provide a minimum level of funding to all
districts. The amount of the minimum funding should be tied to
the increase or decrease of overall state funding for education. 135
The move toward a single formula would also eliminate the
Supplemental GSA, which currently provides additional funding
based on the school district’s number at-risk students. Under the
new proposal, at-risk students would be given an additional
weight of 0.5, which means that they would be funded at a rate
50% higher than general education students would. 136 In addition
to a weighting for at-risk students, the Committee recommends
additional weighting for English Language Learners (ELL),
gross-receipts-tax-sales-or-income-taxes.
131. SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 1.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 6.
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Special Education, High-Cost Special Education, and Gifted &
Talented (G&T). 137 Each of the weights are intended to be
additive, meaning that if a district has a student who qualifies as
both at-risk and ELL, that district would receive payment based
on the sum of both weights. 138 Furthermore, because the
additional funds will be included in the single formula, the funds
will be equalized based on wealth. 139
The Committee also expressed support for including higher
expectations and accountability for schools, students and
spending. However, the Committee was unable to reach a full
consensus on what “expectations should be and what intervention,
if any, would be used by the state for districts that did not meet
expectations.” 140 Instead, they recommended that the State Board
continue to work on their own proposal for the implementation
and execution of reform measures and a process for district
intervention. 141 Regarding spending accountability, the Committee
suggested that school districts be required to account for education
spending at the school level instead of at the district level, as is
currently done. 142 Their rationale was that this will make school
level accounting more transparent and will help uncover improper
funding disparities within districts. 143
The Committee also tried to address the challenge of PTELL
adjustments and local tax rates. Regarding PTELL, the
Committee pointed out that no other state in the union has
“anything similar to the PTELL adjustment and that it was
inappropriate to use the education funding formula for property
tax relief.” 144 Despite this, the Committee was unable to come up
with a concrete recommendation for the problem. Rather, they
determined that additional time was needed to find a solution. In
the meantime, temporary measures, such as constraints on the
upper limits for adjustments, could offer some relief. 145
Regarding property tax rates, the Committee pointed out that
the current school code establishes maximum tax rates by fund/
purpose of each district based on organization type, whether the
district is a unit district (elementary, middle, and high school) or a
single district. 146 The current total of all operating rates for both
elementary and high school districts is greater than the total for
unit districts. 147 That is, both elementary and high school districts
137. Id.
138. Id. at 5.
139. SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 4.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id.
146. SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 9.
147. Id.
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have greater local property tax revenue potential than unit districts.
This provides a disincentive for dual-districts to consolidate into
unit districts. 148 The difference in the rates provides a disincentive
for dual-districts to consolidate into unit districts. This is problematic
because unit districts provide some level of scale, which lowers fixed
cost. 149 Therefore, the Committee determined that elementary,
middle, and high school districts should not have taxing authority
that exceeds that of unit districts. 150
The reforms proposed by Senate Education Funding Advisory
Committee represent a step in the right direction. The move to
include 96% of state funds in a single formula that equalizes for
wealth could help ensure a greater level of equity in state funding.
Currently, only 45% of state education dollars are equalized based
on a district’s relative wealth. Funding at-risk students through
the equalized primary funding formula is also an improvement
over the current system, which does not consider district wealth. 151
The proposed changes to tax rates may help incentivize school
districts to unify into unit districts, which could lower cost.
In the end, however, the proposed reforms still leave Illinois
with a school funding system based on local property tax revenue.
As long as funding relies primarily on local property wealth,
disparities in financial resources and student achievement will
persist. The Committee also failed to sufficiently address the
State’s budget gap, which over the past several years has resulted
in school districts only seeing 89% of the funding they would
normally be entitled to under current law. 152 The recommended
reforms show that legislatures recognize the problem, but the
reality is that any formula driven changes are pointless unless
there is adequate state funding to combat the hugely disparate
property wealth present in state school districts.
In advance of the upcoming 2014 statewide election, powerful
Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan proposed a ballot
measure that would allow voters to decide on whether to increases
taxes by 3% on incomes over a million dollars. 153 The proposed tax
increase would generate more than $1 billion in additional funds
for elementary and high schools, which would translate into
roughly $550 per-pupil. 154 The proposal is controversial and
sparked retorts along partisan lines. Some warned that this was

148. Id.
149. AUGENBLICK, supra note 54, at 19.
150. SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 9.
151. Id. at 6.
152. See AUGENBLICK, supra note 54, at 19.
153. Ray Long et al., Illinois Democrats Go All-in on Class Warfare Theme,
CHI . TRIB. (Mar. 21, 2014), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com
/2014-03-21/news/chi-speaker-madigan-proposes-asking-voters-to-raise-taxeson-wealthy-20140320_1_tax-hike-bruce-rauner-income.
154. Id.
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an attempt to move toward state-funded education, which would
take away local control. Some speculate that the proposal is more
of a political move in advance of the Illinois general election, than
a serious attempt at school-finance reform. 155

IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REFORM
The most facially persuasive argument against changes and
in favor of the current tax and funding structure is the desire to
retain local administration and control. The issues of local control
and local funding have always been controversial and a roadblock
for school finance reform. The recent concerns among some
portions of the electorate regarding the “size of government” and
“redistribution of wealth” have only served to exacerbate the
controversy. The general argument made by advocates of local
control note the connection between community interests and
finance. They argue that districts with a strong interest in
education can control the local tax rate and implement more
funding, when parents desire it. 156 There is also a concern that an
increased role by the state in school finance will correspond to an
increased role by the state in school administration and
regulation. 157

A. Local Funding Allows Spending to Reflect Values
The idea that local communities will be the most responsive
to the educational needs of their students through locally assessed
property taxes is a laudable theory that has sometimes proven to
be true. It has also been shown that pooling local revenues into a
statewide fund that is then redistributed among districts
eliminates the connection that parents feel between taxation and
their local schools.
However, there are a number of flaws with this view of local
funding, particularly as it relates to Illinois. The idea that there is
a nexus between a community’s interests or value in education
and school finance assumes that all districts are relatively equal in
terms of wealth. This is clearly not the case in Illinois. The lower
property tax rates paid by residents in affluent school districts
such as Lake Forest and New Trier do not mean that they value
education less than residents in other districts do. Rather, the
155. Id.
156. TED DABROWSKI, et al., UNDERSTANDING ILLINOIS' BROKEN
EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM : A PRIMER ON G ENERAL STATE AID, ILL. POLICY
INST. 2 (Oct 3, 2013), available at http://www.illinoispolicy.org/wp-content/files
_mf/138213 1296PP_Ed_Finance.pdf.
157. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 52–53 (noting the concern of people in
the state of Texas that “along with increased control of the purse strings at the
state level will go increased control over local policies”).
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students in those communities benefit from a district with a high
concentration of property wealth that allows them to collect ample
funding at lower rates.
The doctrine of local control may also have significant
negative impacts in communities with a high number of retirees,
or families with children in private schools. In those communities,
the interests of the taxpayers may not always align with the best
interests and needs of the public school students. 158 Furthermore,
the data shows that in districts that are property-poor, no matter
how high the tax rate and the corresponding “value” the
community places on education, their property tax revenue will
never be sufficient to provide an adequate education.
The reality is that the idea of a connection between local fiscal
control and the value that community places on education does not
truly reflect the options parents have in Illinois in choosing school
districts. In theory, parents who place a very high value on
education will choose to live in a district with a high property tax
rate and a high level of per-student spending. However, evidence
shows that property-wealthy districts are able to generate a
substantial amount of local revenue at a very low tax rate, while
property-poor districts cannot. In Illinois, parents with the
economic ability to make substantive choices regarding the
communities in which to live do not need to accept a high tax rate
in live in an area that spends heavily on. It is clear that in Illinois
there is no nexus between local financial control and a
community’s commitment to high-quality education.

B. The Myth of Local Control
The second flawed argument against reform is that an
increased role for the State in education finance will lead to
greater state administrative and regulatory control. States have
already started to assume greater control over local districts in the
form of standards and mandates. The last twenty years have seen
an increase in state and federal mandated learning standards that
have created uniform curriculums in the state. The Illinois
Learning Standards define what all students should know and be
able to do in seven core areas as a result of their elementary and
secondary schooling. 159 This has effectively removed a large
portion of what local districts originally managed. However,
assuming local state control is still a legitimate government
interest, 160 local districts can still have decision-making power

158. Kirk J. Stark, Rethinking Statewide Taxation of Nonresidential
Property for Public Schools, 102 YALE L.J. 805, 813–15 (1992).
159. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., Illinois Learning Standards, http://www.isbe
.state.il.us/ILS/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
160. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1196.
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over non-curriculum related matters, even if the state decides to
adopt a statewide finance system. In other words, centralization of
all authority in Springfield does not have to be an absolute when it
comes to state versus local funding.

V. CONCLUSION
The current school funding system in Illinois results in vast
disparities in the instructional money that local school districts
spend on students. Even with the proposed Senate changes, the
formula-driven Foundation Level system is not enough to
overcome the vast disparities in property wealth among state
school districts. The continued use of local property tax revenue
means that affluent school districts will always be able to garner
additional funding and enhance any gap that temporarily closes
with additional GSA funds. 161 The relative small size of districts in
the state compounds the problems caused by demographic and
wealth concentrations throughout the state. This results in
funding imbalances that unfairly disadvantage students in
property-poor districts. Students in property-poor districts are
stuck in a “cruel joke” where their parents end up paying property
tax rates that far exceed those in property-wealthy districts, yet
they
remained
mired
in
a
substandard
educational
environment. 162 These students do not have access to the same
resources that their fellow students in more affluent districts have.
The data shows that the results of this unequal and unjust system
are wide disparities in academic achievements, particularly among
African-American students. 163 The only reasonable conclusion that
can be drawn from this outcome is that the current system that
relies on local property tax revenue to fund education in Illinois is
defective, and we must replaced it with a system that is more
equitable.
One possible solution is for Illinois to move toward a
statewide property tax system and a consolidation of school
districts at the county level. A statewide property tax would give
Springfield greater control over the funding distributions that
have led to such significant disparities over the past two decades.
State control would also lessen the burden on property-poor
districts caused by the high tax rates levied just to make ends
meet.
By contrast, the arguments in favor of retaining the current
161. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the
Preservation of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV .
1835 (2007) (stating that using only state funds to finance education would
democratize it and therefore make all districts on a more even playing field,
rather than the affluent having the most funding because of property taxes).
162. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d. 1241, 1260 (1971).
163. MONEY, supra note 34 at 18.
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system of patchwork school districts, funded at the district level by
local property taxes, are flawed. There is no nexus between the
value residents of a district place on education and their level of
funding. Too many property-poor districts tax at higher rates, yet
see no educational benefit, while property-wealthy districts
commit “less,” and collect huge sums of money for their
abundantly wealthy schools.
Consolidating school districts at the county level will also
promote savings, because the cost of providing an education can be
characterized by economies of scale. Economies of scale exist in
education whenever the per-pupil cost of education declines as the
number of pupils rises. 164 In other words, economies of scale exist
if spending on education per student declines as the number of
students goes up, controlling for school district performance. 165
Economies of scale arise in school district consolidations for a
number of reasons. First, services provided to each student by
education professionals may not diminish as the number of
students increase. 166 For example, all districts require a
superintendent and a school board. This same central
administration may be able to serve a significant increase in the
number of enrolled students, with little change to actual operating
cost. 167 Educating students requires certain physical capital or
fixed overhead, such as heating systems, air conditioning,
computer labs, sports facilities, and science labs. These all require
a certain scale to operate efficiently, and therefore have a higher
cost per student in smaller districts. 168 Larger districts are in a
better position to employ specialized teachers, making it easier to
provide the wide range of courses required by state exams and
expected by students, parents, and colleges. 169
An alternative to the statewide property tax is to move to a
countywide property tax. The biggest driver of school finance
inequality is the state’s patchwork of school districts, which are
often segregated by wealth. A greater distribution of property tax
revenue can be achieved by consolidating school districts at the
county level. This, in turn, will lead to a greater equalization of
per-pupil funding within a newly consolidated district. For
example, within Lake County, District 60 in Waukegan spends
about $8,059 on per-pupil instruction alone (excluding operational

164. William D. Duncombe & John M. Yinger, School District
Consolidation: The Benefits and Costs, 67 THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR 10
(2010), available at http://www.aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id
=13218.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. William D. Duncombe & John M. Yinger, Does School District
Consolidation Cut Costs?, 2 EDUC. FIN. AND POL’Y 341, 345 (2007).
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cost), 170 while eight miles down the road District 115 in Lake
Forest spends over $12,000. 171 The residents of Waukegan do not
spend less on educating their children because they value
education less; they spend less because they have less. Therefore,
a countywide system would ensure greater parity between schools
within the district.
A move toward countywide school districts would also create a
link between PTELLs and school districts. Currently, PTELL
referendums take place at the county level, but have a
disproportionately negative impact on property-poor districts
within that county. Now, all parents in a county considering a
PTELL will be treated the same by the outcome of their vote.
In addition to consolidating school districts at the county level
and shifting property tax authority to Springfield or the county,
the State should continue to pursue the Senate’s proposals. This
includes continuing to explore the difficult question of PTELLs
and TIFs. Further, representatives in Springfield should be bold
and adopt the funding levels recommended by the EFAB. This
may mean implementing a small increase in statewide taxes along
the lines of the proposal that Dawn Clark Netsch made. 172 Tax
increases are never popular, but education is too important to
ignore. The correlation between success in elementary and high
school and success later on in life is irrefutable, and we must
address it as a state.
A move toward a statewide or countywide property tax and
consolidated districts would begin to reverse the inequality and
inadequacy that is so apparent in the Prairie State’s public
education system. A child’s access to a quality education should
not be dependent on his or her zip code. It is time for Springfield to
commit fully to the goal of providing educational development to
all Illinoisans through an efficient system of high equality public
schools. As Sam Seaborn said in The West Wing, “education is the
silver bullet . . . [it] is everything.” 173

170. Waukegan CUSD 60, ILLINOIS REPORT CARD 2013-2014, http://
illinoisreportcard.com/District.aspx?districtId=34049060026 (last visited Feb.
1, 2015).
171. Lake Forest CHSD 115, ILLINOIS REPORT CARD 2013–2014, http://
illinoisreportcard.com/SearchResult.aspx?SearchText=$lake%20fore$&type=
NAME (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
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173. West Wing: Six Meetings Before Lunch (NBC television broadcast Apr.
5, 2000).
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